<P>The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In <I>Why Intelligence Fails</I>, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. </P><P>The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis''s findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community''s performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis''s conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassif