Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment av John (Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Religion Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Religion

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The striking extent of religious disagreement suggests that religious conviction is very often the result of processes that do not reliably produce true beliefs. For this reason, many have argued that the only rational response to religious disagreement is to adopt a religious skepticism that eschews confident religious belief. Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment contests this skeptical conclusion, explaining how it could be rational to maintain confident belief even in the face of the epistemic worries posed by disagreement. John Pittard argues against the commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality that underlies the case for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism, while also critiquing approaches to disagreement that allow for the unproblematic privileging of one''s first-person perspective. He emphasizes the importance of having rational insight into reasons that favor one''s outlook; however, he challenges narrowly intellectualist accounts of insight, arguing